



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

# J-5 (PLANS AND POLICY) DIRECTORATE

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J-5 M 52-58  
2 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Joint Staff

Subject: Status of Actions in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Berlin

1. On 1 December, officers from J-5 attended a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Berlin. The following information and proposed actions were noted:

*RELEASE*  
a. A revised contingency plan has been received from the Allied Commandants of Berlin. We were informed that the British and French rebuked their Commandants for joining in this revision. State will prepare a proposed State-Defense message to U.S. Embassy, Bonn, containing guidance on the revised plan and directing appropriate coordination with the British and French. Joint Staff officers are studying this plan to see whether or not it is adequate in scope, since it is felt the air situation must be considered also.

b. State distributed a paper analyzing and commenting upon the most recent Soviet note. This note is largely propaganda and that aspect of it will be answered by U.S. propaganda measures. However, there are other specific proposals included. The State paper contains a Section D which forms a preliminary basis for a U.S. position with respect to the Soviet proposals on Berlin. Joint Staff suggestions with respect to this Section will be welcomed. A listing of the significant points in this Section is attached at the Enclosure.

2. It is proposed that the Soviet note will not be answered until after a Four Power meeting on 15 December. However, it is desirable to get out the position paper early before the British can again come up with some soft paper.

*SECRET*

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NO OJCS OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION.  
REQUIRES State clearance  
DATE 4 Apr 1979

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Classification Review By *Paul*  
( ) DECLASSIFY  
( ) RECLASSIFY IN PART  
( ) EXCISE ( ) DENT  
( ) Non-responsive information  
FOIA Exemptions (a)  
PA Exemption (e)  
APPEALS REVIEW PANEL DATE 12/12/61  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

3. In the end, and before the expiration of the "period of grace" granted by Khrushchev, we will probably find it necessary to come through on our promises to protect West Berlin by force if necessary. Consequently, after the exhaustion of peaceful remedies along the lines contained in the Enclosure, there would have to be a reiteration direct to the Soviet Union by the three Allied Powers of their legal position and of their determination to themselves assume the obligations of the Soviet Union for the protection of the Allied garrisons in West Berlin and of their access rights. This would be accompanied by appropriate deployment of forces and other mobilization measures.

DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON  
Major General, USA  
Director, J-3

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS CONTAINED IN  
SECTION D OF STATE PAPER CONCERNING A POSSIBLE  
REPLY TO THE RECENT SOVIET NOTE ON BERLIN

1. A U.S. reply to the Soviet note, which would largely avoid polemics, could set out:

a. The legal position, i.e., that the Soviet Union cannot unilaterally divest itself of its obligations; that if it insists on renouncing these, they can only devolve on the other three principal Allied Powers and not on any fifth party, least of all the so-called GDR together with a proposal all parties to the agreements submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice for decision.

b. A negotiating posture. Presumably this would follow the line suggested in the November 27 press release, i.e., that we are prepared to negotiate on the question of all of Germany of which Berlin is only a part. There might be some modification in our position as to the terms of this negotiation possibly along the somewhat softer lines of the German note of November 14.

2. A possible approach suggested by the Soviet note would be to take a new approach to the German problem on the assertion that the USSR, by renouncing its obligations regarding Germany both in practice and in principle, has forfeited or foregone its rights in Germany. Following up such a line would hardly bring any substantive changes in policy but it might give us greater maneuverability in negotiating and permit us to restate the underlying issues in fresher and more persuasive terms.

3. Assuming that direct negotiations cannot be arranged or that they fail, either or both seems likely, there would still be further steps to take to demonstrate that we had exhausted all peaceful procedures. These would include:

a. Charges in the UN Security Council that the Soviet action is a threat to the peace. This action would presumably meet with a Soviet veto but would provide a good forum for bringing out the nature of the threatened Soviet aggressive act.

b. Additional efforts to resort to the International Court of Justice for the upholding of our legal position. Such efforts would presumably be unavailing since the USSR probably would not accept ICJ jurisdiction.